This paper seeks to characterize incentive compensation in a principal-agent moral hazard setting in which the principal is prudent, or downside risk averse, as many situations (such as that of a patient in hospital or a regulator dealing with food safety) suggest she should be. We show that optimal incentive pay should then be 'approximately concave' in performance, the approximation being closer the more downside risk averse the principal is compared to the agent. Limiting the agent's liability would improve the approximation, but taxing the principal would make it coarser. The notion of an approximately concave function we introduce here to describe the pay-performance relationship is relatively recent in mathematics; it is intuitive and translates into concrete empirical implications, notably for the composition of incentive pay. We also clarify which measure of prudence -among the various ones proposed in the literature -is relevant to investigate the tradeoff between downside risk sharing and incentives.
Our main result is that incentive compensation should then be 'approximately concave'in performance (in the formal sense due to Páles 2003) , the approximation being closer the more prudent the principal is relative to the agent. This proposition sheds light on the tradeo¤ between downside risk sharing and incentives. Roughly speaking, as they approach concavity, incentives become more sensitive to outcomes in the range where they are mediocre, thereby transfering the agent greater downside risk; a more prudent principal would likely a¤ord such incentives. Making this intuition precise, however, required us to …rst invoke, in a principal-agent moral hazard setting, Modica and Scarsini (2005) 's 'coe¢ cient of downside risk aversion'-instead of Kimball (1990) Moreover, describing the pay-performance relationship as approximately concave has concrete empirical implications. CEO compensation, for instance, involves capped bonuses and similar concave devices, as well as call options that tend to 'convexify' remuneration; in this context, approaching concavity more closely means that the former elements receive greater weight in the overall pay package.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model -a static principalagent model where the agent is e¤ort and risk averse while the principal is both risk averse and prudent.
Adopting the …rst-order approach is justi…ed using Jung and Kim (2015) 's recent and very general assumptions. Our central result -that the optimal contract should in that case be approximately concave, thereby seeking a balance in the downside risk respectively borne by the agent and the principal -is established in Section 3. The section ends with a pair of numerical examples corroborating this statement. Section 4 looks next brie ‡y into empirical matters. Section 5 extends our main result, showing how two frequent contextual elements -limiting the agent's liability or taxing the principal -might a¤ect the downside-risk/incentives tradeo¤: limited liability brings compensation closer to concavity in the range where it varies with performance, taxes have the opposite e¤ect. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
The model
Consider an agent -standing for a physician, a …nancial advisor, a regulated …rm, a foreign subsidiary, a CEO, etc. -whose preferences can be represented by a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u( ) de…ned over monetary payments. We assume this function is three-times di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly concave, formally u 0 ( ) > 0 and u 00 ( ) < 0, so the agent is risk averse.
This agent can work for a principal -namely a patient, an individual investor, a regulator, a multinational's executive, a corporate board, etc. -whose preferences are represented by the Von NeumannMorgenstern utility function v( ) de…ned over net …nal wealth. We suppose this function is increasing and strictly concave, i.e. v 0 ( ) > 0 and v 00 ( ) < 0, so the principal is risk averse. Moreover, the marginal utility v 0 ( ) is convex, i.e. v 000 ( ) > 0, which means that the principal is downside risk averse or (equivalently) prudent (Menezes et al. 1980; Kimball 1990 ).
The principal's pro…t depends stochastically on the agent's e¤ort level a. The latter cannot be observed, however, while the agent incurs a cost of e¤ort c(a) that is increasing and convex (c 0 (a) > 0 and c 00 (a) 0).
The principal only gets a veri…able signal s, drawn from a compact subset S = [s ; s] of R, which is correlated with the agent's e¤ort through a conditional probability distribution F (s; a). This distribution has a density f (s; a) which is di¤erentiable in a and strictly positive on S. The function L F (s; a) = fa(s;a) f (s;a)
then denotes the likelihood ratio of signal s. Based on the realized value of s, the principal receives a bene…t (s) expressed in monetary terms, which we suppose increasing and concave or linear in s ( 0 (s) > 0 and 00 (s) 0), and she pays the agent a compensation w(s).
The principal's problem is to …nd a reward schedule w(s) that maximizes her expected utility, under the constraints that the agent will then maximize his own expected utility (the incentive compatibility constraint) and must ex ante receive an expected utility that is not inferior to some external one U 0 (the participation constraint). This can be written formally as
subject to
Without losing generality, we shall concentrate on smooth (i.e., twice continuously di¤erentiable) contracts w( ) such that, for D 1 ; D 2 ; :::; D n a …nite partition of S, the derivatives w
with M i a positive real number. At any performance signal s, the agent's marginal revenue will therefore be bounded. This amounts to saying that the allowed incentive schemes are locally Lipschitz continuous:
for any w(s) on each set D i , j w(x) w(s) j M i j x s j for all x; s 2 D i . This restriction, which will be useful later in the proofs, seems rather innocuous, since the exogenous number n and ceilings M i 's are arbitrary, and since any continuous function can be approximated as closely as wanted by a sequence of locally Lipschitz maps (Miculescu 2000).
The …rst-order approach
For tractability reasons, one usually replaces the incentive compatibility constraint by a relaxed constraint based on the …rst-order necessary condition for the agent's utility-maximizing e¤ort a. This transforms the principal's initial problem into the following one:
( ) where and denote the constraints'respective Lagrange multipliers. This so-called '…rst-order approach' delivers for sure a solution to problem (1) under the following hypotheses.
, where the inequality holds strictly on a set of positive measure.
i for every i = 1; :::; n) also belongs to Z. Assumption 1 is a …rst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) condition with respect to . It basically says that higher e¤ort by the agent makes higher pro…ts more likely. Assumption 2 is a concave increasing set probability (CISP) condition with respect to ( ; L F ), which then adds that the agent's e¤ort is subject (probabilistically) to decreasing returns.
The next statement corresponds to Jung and Kim (2015)'s Proposition 11.
Lemma 1 Problem (2) is equivalent to problem (1) if F (s; a) satis…es Assumptions 1 and 2.
Jung and Kim (2015) demonstrate this lemma. They also show (Proposition 12) that the assumptions made allow more probability distributions (hence are weaker) than any of those used so far in the literature.
Downside risk aversion
Let us write R u = Kimball (1990) . Our results, however, rather rely on the products show how much the agent and the principal would respectively pay to avoid a risk with greater negative skewness. In other words, P u and P v deal with the strength of an optimal response to risk; they are attached to a decision, and their de…nition involves establishing a 'precautionary'premium & via the …rst- Let Dom(u) and Dom(v) refer to the respective domains of the utility functions u and v. We now introduce a key de…nition.
De…nition 2 For some constant real number k 1, the principal is said to be more downside risk averse than the agent by a factor k if, for any real numbers x 2 Dom(u) and y x 2 Dom(v), we have that
In other words, the principal is more downside risk averse than the agent by a factor k 1 if, for any amount y to be split between the two and any agent's share x of this amount, the principal's coe¢ cient of downside risk aversion d v taken at her wealth level (y x) is at least k times bigger than the agent's own coe¢ cient d u (x). This de…nition is trivially met when the agent's utility function is quadratic, since u 000 (x) = 0 and the agent in this case displays no downside risk aversion (d u (x) = 0). The de…nition also holds when the agent and the principal respectively have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions u(x) = exp( x) and v(y x) = exp( k (y x)), with k 1, because the coe¢ cients of downside risk aversion are then constant. One more example is when the parties respectively have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions u(x) =
, so for all x, y x we have that
This completes the model's description. Let us now proceed to characterize the optimal incentive scheme in this context. 4 Incidentally, note that neither the prudence coe¢ cient indices Pu, Pv nor the downside risk aversion coe¢ cients du, dv retain similar global properties as the corresponding Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion. Keenan and Snow (2002) propose instead an alternative index which does increase under monotonic downside risk averse transformations of the utility function. One can show, nevertheless, that du, dv increase as their respective utility functions u, v become more concave while the marginal utilities u 0 , v 0 are more convex (Crainich and Eeckhoudt 2008 ).
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This section will establish that a principal who is more downside risk averse than the agent should set an incentive compensation package that is approximately concave in outcome. We shall …rst de…ne approximate concavity, then state and prove our central result, then illustrate it with two examples.
Approximate concavity
The following de…nition is adapted from Páles (2003).
5
De…nition 3 Let I be a subinterval of the real line R and ; some nonnegative real numbers. A function
for all x; y 2 I and t
The function g is of course concave when = = 0. Examples of approximately concave functions are pictured in subsection 3.3 below.
Combining Páles (2003)'s theorems 4 and 5 provides a natural description of a (
which is the situation we will encounter here.
Lemma 2 Let I be a subinterval of the real line R and a nonnegative number. A function g : I ! R is ( ; 0)-concave on I if there exists a nonincreasing function q : I ! R such that g(y) g(x) + q(x)(y x) + 2 j y x j for all x; y 2 I.
For completeness, a proof of this lemma is given in the Appendix. 6 One may notice that the above function q bears a close resemblance to a subgradient. The literature indeed says that g is nonincreasingly ( ; 0)-subdi¤ erentiable when such a function exists.
We are now ready to move on.
Approximately concave incentive schemes
In order to characterize the agent's incentive contract, we need to make the following assumption, which implies Assumption 1 when the signal s is one-dimensional (Whitt 1980 ; Sinclair-Desgagné 1994).
f (s;a) is nondecreasing and concave in s for any a.
This is the so-called concave monotone likelihood ratio property (CMLRP), an assumption which is rather common in principal-agent analysis. It is satis…ed by many familiar distributions, such as the Poisson 5 Páles (2003) actually de…nes and works with approximately convex functions. One has to be careful, because some of his results do not straightforwardly carry over after reversing the inequality sign. 6 It may be worth mentioning the reader that the direct converse of Lemma 2 is not true, so this lemma does not convey with mean a, the gamma with mean a, and the chi-squared with degree of freedom parameter a. 7 It "(...) suggests that variations in output at higher levels are relatively less useful in providing 'information' on the agent's e¤ort than they are at lower levels of output" (Jewitt 1988 , p. 1181). Let us stress that assuming a concave likelihood ratio does not make the optimal contract trivially concave in outcome.
Hemmer et al. (2000), for instance, need Assumption 3 to justify the …rst-order approach; yet, their analysis supports the use of convex incentive devices. Now, the Kuhn-Tucker necessary and su¢ cient conditions require that a solution to program (2) meet
The multiplier being positive, Assumption 3 entails that the right-hand-side of (3) is increasing in the signal s. This allows to say the following.
Lemma 3
The optimal reward schedule w (s) is increasing in the performance signal s.
To prove this lemma, in the Appendix, we take the …rst derivative with respect to s of the left-handside of expression (3), then seek conditions which are necessary to make it positive, since the right-hand side's derivative with respect to s is positive by Assumption 3. Similarly taking the second derivative of expression (3)'s left-hand-side and using the same line of argument yields the central result of this paper.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the principal is more downside risk averse than the agent by a factor k.
(i) Then the optimal wage schedule w (s) is ( (k); 0)-concave at any s 2 S.
(ii) The number (k) decreases with k and tends to 0 as k grows.
The proof in the Appendix shows that convergence to concavity may not be asymptotic: when
k , i.e. the agent's earnings do not grow too fast with respect to the principal's net bene…t, then we have (k) = 0 so w (s) is concave at s. In the region where it is not perfectly concave, moreover, the optimal wage schedule has a nonincreasing ( (k); 0)-subgradient which is precisely the derivative 0 (s) of the principal's bene…t function; the contracted payment is thus aligning -albeit imperfectly -the agent's incentives on the principal's interests.
The theorem's conclusion holds vacuously -hence the optimal incentive scheme is concave -when the agent is not prudent (since u 000 0 implies d u 0, k can then be as big as wanted). If the agent is prudent (i.e. u 000 > 0), the theorem says that the pay-performance relationship will only get closer to concavity as the principal's downside risk aversion grows. 8 For concreteness, the upcoming subsection provides some numerical examples. 7 These distributions can be transformed into ones that have compact support and satisfy the previous assumptions by suitably reallocating the probability mass in the tails. 8 To be very clear, the term 'closer' we have used so far, and will be using later on, does not refer to greater curvature, but to being more like some concave function (which turns out here to be an a¢ ne transformation of the pro…t function).
Two examples
Let the principal's bene…t function take the speci…c form (s) = p s; s 2 [0; +1), and let the distribution F (s; a), parameterized by the agent's discrete e¤ort levels a 2 f1; 2; 3g, be a gamma distribution with mean a; 0 < .
The agent is not prudent
First, consider a risk averse and prudent principal and a risk averse but non-prudent agent. Let their respective utility functions be given by u(x) = x bx 2 and v(z) = ln(z +10), taking b > 0 so that u 0 (x) > 0 on the relevant domain. The …rst-order condition (3) comes up to
where A(s) = + s a a 2 . Hence, the optimal reward function is
with B(s) = (1 + 2b:( p s + 100)). It can be checked that this increasing reward function satis…es w 00 (s) < 0, so the optimal incentive scheme is concave, as expected. This scheme is shown in Figure 1 
8s .
Write again A(s) = + s a a 2 . We have that
When k = 2, condition (3) amounts instead to
The latter equation has one increasing in s root
Figure 2 portrays the two incentive schemes (6) and (7) penalties, put options, or capped linear bonuses) and its non-concave one (call options, for example). The
Lipschitz constant attached to the latter component will correspond to half the coe¢ cient (k), and a convenient proxy for this constant might be the weight the contract is putting on nonconcave incentive devices.
Regarding downside risk aversion, one may want to measure the agent's and the principal's respective indices d u and d v directly or, knowing that d u = P u R u and d v = P v R v , assess the agent's and the principal's respective degrees of risk aversion R u , R v and prudence P u , P v by applying some measurement method or using already available data. 10 Note that a principal's prudence might sometimes be inferred indirectly. In the vast empirical literature on CEO compensation, for instance, certain works suggest that regulation (in the utility sector, notably) or public pressure (especially for 'socially responsible' …rms) would add to …duciary duties to ultimately make corporate boards/principals quite prudent.
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To test the above statements, moreover, what matters is not only whether the principal is downside risk averse but also, and more importantly, how much more downside risk averse she is relative to the agent. A good proxy for this gap might be some estimate of the agent's in ‡uence on the principal; the greater it is, the lower the factor k in the above theorem and propositions. 
An important issue for the theory of incentives is whether, and to what extent, an incentive contract is
in ‡uenced by its contextual background. Two customary elements of this background are limited liability and taxation. To check the robustness of our characterization, and thereby sharpen intuition on the tradeo¤ between downside risk sharing and incentives, this section will now successively consider these elements. It will be shown that they e¤ectively alter the tradeo¤, but in opposite ways.
Limiting the agent' s liability
Suppose the agent's revenue is bounded from below, so he cannot bear very high penalties when performance is bad. Remuneration is frequently subject to this type of constraint. 12 An agent with limited wealth, for instance, can …le for bankruptcy if he cannot a¤ord paying some penalty. In other contexts, institutions that prevent an agent from breaching his contract under bad circumstances might simply not exist.
Without loss of generality, let us then normalize the agent's minimum revenue to zero. The principal's optimization problem becomes
subject to R s2S u(w(s))dF a (s; a) c 0 (a) 0;
where (s) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the nonnegative wage constraint at signal s.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a solution to this problem are this time given by the equation
with (s)w(s) = 0 at all s. Arguments and computations similar to those of Section 3 lead to the following statement.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the principal is more downside risk averse than the agent by a factor k. If the agent is protected by limited liability, then:
(i) The optimal wage schedule is such that w 1 (s) = 0 for any signal s below a threshold s 1 and w 1 (s)
is ( 1 (k); 0)-concave when s > s 1 .
(ii) The number 1 (k) decreases with k and tends to 0 as k grows.
(iii) For s > s 1 and any given k, 1 (k) (k) so w 1 (s) is closer to being concave than the incentive scheme w (s) obtained in Theorem 1.
On the range where pay varies with performance, the proposition describes an optimal incentive scheme analogous to the one outlined in the above Theorem. But part (iii) adds an intuitive feature. Since limited liability shelters the agent from the worst outcomes, the prudent principal can a¤ord having him bear more downside risk across the range where compensation is linked to outcomes. On this range, she then selects a wage schedule that is closer to a concave one than the schedule she would choose under no limited liability constraint.
Taxing the principal' s bene…ts
Suppose now that the principal's net bene…ts are subject to a constant tax rate which applies when they are positive. The incentive scheme chosen by the principal must be a solution to
where S 2 = fs 2 S; (s) w(s) 0g and S 2 = fs 2 S; (s) w(s) < 0g are endogenous sets.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions in this case are given by two equations:
The next proposition, which is derived using the same proof arguments as before, expresses how the principal then trades o¤ downside risk sharing and incentives.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the principal is more downside risk averse than the agent by a factor k. If a constant tax rate applies to the principal's net bene…ts when they are positive, then:
(i) the optimal wage schedule is ( 2 (k); 0)-concave when net bene…ts are negative, where the number 2 (k) gets smaller with k and tends to 0 as k grows;
(ii) the optimal wage schedule is ( 2 (k; ); 0)-concave when net bene…ts are positive, where the number 2 (k; ) gets smaller with k and tends to 0 as k grows; (iii) 2 (k; ) increases with , so the higher the tax rate the cruder the pay-performance concavity.
Statements (i) and (ii) characterize the chosen incentive scheme over the complementary domains where net bene…ts are respectively negative and positive; in both cases, the optimal wage schedule mirrors the one described in Theorem 1. Part (iii), however, raises the possibility of incentive pay leaning away from concavity. Recall that downside risk aversion makes the principal worry more about the variability of net bene…ts in bad states than in good states. When positive net bene…ts are taxed, the principal associates positive net bene…ts with states which are relatively less good; she then becomes more sensitive to risk at those states. As the tax rate increases, willingness to have the agent bear more of this risk grows, so the pay-performance relationship turns further aside from concavity.
Concluding remarks
When the principal or the agent are prudent (or downside risk averse), an optimal contract must trade o¤ downside risk sharing and incentives. This paper …rst pointed out that the appropriate measure of downside risk aversion to investigate this tradeo¤ is the coe¢ cient introduced by Modica and Scarsini (2005) . This coe¢ cient -the ratio of the third over the …rst derivative of the utility function -precisely indicates how much someone would be willing to pay to avoid a risk with greater negative skewness. Next, we showed that an optimal incentive package will be approximately concave in the relevant outcomes (in the precise mathematical sense due to Páles 2003), the approximation being closer the more the principal is downside risk averse compared with the agent. Intuitively, approaching a concave function shifts more downside risk upon the agent, since remuneration is then more variable on the whole in adverse circumstances. This result is qualitatively robust to limiting the agent's liability or taxing the principal, although these common contextual features might a¤ect the approximation in opposite directions (making it better or coarser, respectively).
Our characterization of incentive pay adds to the literature in one more aspect. Previous investigations of the pay-performance relationship have seeked to support or explain the use of a peculiar device, like stock options or discretionary bonuses. In practice, however, incentive contracts are compound packages made of various items, some concave and other convex or linear in outcome. As we argued in Section 4, the above results -thanks to the notion of approximate concavity -can cope with such packages: coming closer to concavity means that convex devices like call options have become relatively less signi…cant in the overall pay package than concave items like linear bonuses with a cap. Our theorem and propositions thus have strong empirical content; meeting the data seems doable and is certainly looked out for. This addresses a recurrent concern with principal-agent theory.
All in all, …nally, this paper can be seen as …tting a research program that studies how compensation is shaped by plausible attributes of the principal's preferences. Pursuing such a program further might deliver other empirically testable insights on remuneration. It would also allow, in some cases, a normative analysis of incentive pay. In some situations, indeed, certain risk attitudes by the principal may be called for. In health care, for instance, one may take the Hyppocratic oath as a traditional call for medical prudence (see Linden 1999) . In corporate governance, one may interpret the …duciary duty of care that corporate boards/principals must obey as imposing 'prudence'on their decision making (see Clark 1985) , in particular when they set executive pay. In these contexts, statements like the ones contained in our theorem and propositions would have to be seen as requirements (not predictions) on the pay-performance relationship.
APPENDIX Proof of Lemma 2.
Since we work here with approximately concave rather than approximately convex functions, the proof combines and adapts our notation and context to the arguments underlying theorems 4 and 5 in Páles
Suppose there is a nonincreasing function q : I ! R such that g(y) g(x) + q(x)(y x) + 2 j y x j for all x; y 2 I. The latter inequality can be rewritten as q(x)(y x) g(y) g(x) 2 j y x j for all x; y 2 I .
Take the primitive function of q, which is Q(x) = This function Q : I ! R is concave since q is non increasing.
Let x = t 0 < t 1 < ::: < t n = y be an arbitrary grid on I. Applying the above inequality successively to t i 1 and t i for i = 1; :::; n and summing up gives
If max i (t i t i 1 ) is small enough, the latter implies that
Hence, if the grid is again …ne enough, we have that
De…ne`: I ! R as`(x) = g(x) Q(x). The upshot is that
For t 2 [0; 1], this conclusion and the triangle inequality entail that
=`(tx + (1 t)y) + t(1 t) j x y j for all x; y 2 I . Now, since Q is concave, we have tQ(x) + (1 t)Q(y) Q(tx + (1 t)y). Adding this inequality and the latter one leads to tg(x) + (1 t)g(y) g(tx + (1 t)y) + t(1 t) j x y j for all x; y 2 I and t 2 [0; 1] .
Hence, g is ( ; 0)-concave.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Risk aversion of at least one player is su¢ cient to obtain that w 0 (s) 0. Indeed we have, with v( (s) w(s)) denoted as v( ) and u(w(s)) denoted as u( ):
The latter must be positive, by Assumption 3, in order to satisfy equation (3) . A necessary condition for this is w 0 (s) 0.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Let us now compute the second derivative of the left-hand side term in equation (3) . Assumption 3 entails it must be negative. 
The last term here is in fact
, which must be positive by equation (3) and Assumption 3. Then:
The sign of this last expression depends on the sign of ( 0 w 0 ) 2 P v R v w 02 P u R u , which writes explicitly
Two cases are possible. Either
by assumption and De…nition 1 makes it necessary that w 00 (s) < 0 (so w is concave at s); or
Recall that the derivatives w 0 (s) are locally bounded by assumption. Thus, there exist positive real
For all x 2 S; x 6 = s; then:
Hence,
Now, since w is di¤erentiable at s, we have that
with the residual r(x) satisfying lim x!s r(x)
x s = 0. The last inequality entails that
if x is su¢ ciently close to s. Since 0 (s) is decreasing in s by assumption, applying Lemma 2 yields that w(s) is ( (k); 0)-concave on a subinterval of S that contains s. Since this is to be true at any point s, keeping the same number (k), then w (s) is ( (k); 0)-concave on S. This proves assertion (i).
Assertion (ii) is immediate when considering the above construction of (k),
Proof of Proposition 1.
The conclusion of Lemma 3 still holds here, so the optimal wage schedule w 1 (s) must be increasing in its argument s. There is therefore a threshold s 1 such that w 1 (s) = 0 for s s 1 and w 1 (s) > 0 for s > s 1 . 
Proof of Proposition 2.
When s 2 S 2 , net bene…ts are negative so the principal is not taxed. Theorem 1 then applies and the optimal wage schedule w 2 (s) is ( As in the proof of the theorem, two cases are possible. Either This inequality can be written 0 (s) w 0 (s)
Let M 00 = max Di \ S2 6 = ?
M i , and take 2 (k; ) > 0 so that
The latter inequality reduces to
For all x 2 S 2 ; x 6 = s; it follows that j ( 0 (s) w 0 (s))(x s) j < 2 (k; ) 4M 00 w 0 (s) j x s j To demonstrate assertion (iii), note that, as it is de…ned in (17), 2 (k; ) must increase with .
